LAW and 

(QUick Action Deployment)

By: David R. Wood

April 20, 1999, was truly one of the darkest days of my life. That was the day the Columbine massacre occurred. As with other horrible events that have occurred in our country such as the Kennedy and King assassinations, the shuttle explosion, and the bombing in Okalahoma City, I can recall exactly where I was when I first heard about the tragedy at Columbine. I turned to CNN as Police and Fire personnel responded to the school and I watched as children ran out with their hands on their heads. I listened as CNN personnel talked to students on cell phones as they were hiding in the school. As with many decisions and policy changes in police work there has to be a catalyst event that forces us to recognize a need to make changes in policies and tactics. Columbine is the catalyst event that has forced those of us in law enforcement to come up with an effective controlled response to active shooter situations.

Since 1996 there have been over 30 shootings in our schools throughout the country. What are the similarities between these school shootings? Most victims were targeted randomly; and most of the suspects had previously brought a gun to school. The suspects ranged in age from 11 to 18 years, and all of the suspects were Caucasian with the exception of one female and one African American. The majority of the suspects had a poor or obsessive relationship with girls, the suspects’ actions were planned and well thought-out, they had easy access to guns; and they made threats about wanting to hurt people and those threats were not taken seriously.

Following the Littleton Colorado situation, Walter Distelzweig, a deputy chief with the Columbus, Ohio, Division of Police, realized the need to prepare for such a situation if it were to occur in our city. With representatives from the Division of Police, Deputy Chief Distelzweig mustered representatives from the Division of Fire and the public school administration to help formulate plans to deal with a critical incident within our 166 area schools. The bulk of the preparation for the Division of Police was given to our full time SWAT Section. Throughout the summer of 1999 our 26 S.W.A.T. officers developed a tactical plan that can be used universally, throughout law enforcement circles, to deal with these horrendous situations. Hundreds of hours have been spent formulating plans, practicing the scenarios, debriefing the training, revising the tactics and adjusting the plans. Although this process was arduous we eventually developed a tactical plan that we believe will save many lives. The plan known as "QUAD" (QUick Action Deployment) concept was born. We proceeded to train the 1,750 officers within the Columbus, Ohio, Division of Police and hundreds of other officers throughout the Central Ohio area. It is crucial that all officers within the same metropolitan area be on the same page when it pertains to "active shooter" situations. Over the past two years we have presented QUAD Training Seminars (administrative and practical) to officers and supervisors from agencies throughout the United States and Canada. "QUAD" has become the preferred philosophy and tactic utilized by police agencies throughout the U.S. when faced with an "active shooter" situation. While it involves a shift from the old fundamental philosophy of, "contain and wait for S.W.A.T", QUAD presents first responding officers with the tactics necessary to save lives during an "active shooter" situation.

So what’s the hurry? Imagine a situation where people are being shot and the shooting does not cease. Some of the victims are dead and many are wounded. Every moment you wait, more people are being shot and more are dying from their wounds. Most of these situations are over within 5 to 7 minutes. Within the Columbine High School library, defenseless students were randomly shot over a period of 22 minutes. The dedicated officers that were the first responders to Columbine were caught off guard. The truth is, all of us in the law enforcement community were caught off guard. None of us saw this coming! We have all been taught to contain the critical incident and hold it for the tactical teams. While this is still the best way to handle most situations, we must recognize the absolute need to change our philosophy as it pertains to "active shooter" situations. As police officers and particularly police supervisors, we must understand the moral, legal, and civil liability associated with failing to do so. We understand that some of your first responders may not be your most aggressive or "tactically sound" officers, but we believe that, given the proper training, most will accept the challenge and perform their assignments properly. We recognize that some officers may refuse to enter such a dangerous situation, but we believe they are in the minority. The law enforcement officers who cannot put themselves into such a situation are not bad people; but perhaps they should consider a different career path.

The QUAD philosophy is easy to understand. If officers are at a scene and people are being shot and/or seriously injured and the acts are in progress, entry into the building is required with a minimum of four officers. Obviously no two situations are ever the same. We can play "what if" scenarios all day long and never come up with the one scenario you may face. Could a situation come up where two or three officers decide they need to take action because additional units are too far off? Absolutely! The two officers that defused the situation in Santee, California chose to make entry and did a wonderful job. Note: We realize that some officers have, and will continue, to enter these situations with less than four officers, but for training purposes, four is the proper number required.

With the proper training, QUAD tactics can be learned by officers who have not received prior tactical training. The goal of the QUAD formation is very limited, focused, and therefore, easily learned by first responders. The one and only mission is to locate and stop the "active shooter(s)". Remember that the "active shooter" normally has an excellent tactical plan that involves randomly shooting as many people as possible, and as quickly as possible, prior to committing suicide. The only way to minimize the number of casualties is to neutralize the shooter. Becoming pre-occupied with evacuating people, treating the injured, and/or searching the rooms, allows the shooter more time to maximize the body count. We must encounter the shooter quickly, force the surrender decision, and then be in a position to get medical assistance to those who need it, NOW! Walking past bombs, stepping over injured children, and running past rooms full of terrified individuals does sound ridiculous. Can we actually do this? I don’t know. I do know, however, morally and tactically it is the right thing to do! Every moment we spend hesitating at a bomb, carrying out an injured child, or evacuating a classroom, the shooter is making more victims. As we spend the majority of our time carrying out the victims, the shooter(s) continues on their rampage and the carnage will not end until their ammunition is exhausted. It’s going to be a bad day to be a cop! We have to remain focused on our mission. We must get to the shooter, end the situation, and get help to the injured! We have a limited amount of time to get the injured to a medical facility; therefore, any options that lengthen that time must be abandoned.

While I may be unable to fully explain all of the dynamics involved in the QUAD tactical movements within the limited space of this article, I do want to illustrate the QUAD formation and the responsibilities of those officers inside it. Officers must first determine whether the situation requires immediate entry. The following two questions have to be answered; "Is violence actually taking place", and "Is it occurring right now?" If the answers are yes, then immediate entry is required. Before entry is made the officers must notify their communication/dispatch center of their decision to make entry and their entry location.

Four officers form into a modified diamond formation and enter the building. The QUAD formation consists of one point officer, two utility officers (one on the right and one on the left), and a rear guard. The point officer is long cover and is responsible for all threats to the front. The utility officers are only responsible for the next unsecured area on their side of the hallway. Their only concern is getting the formation safely past the next doorway. The rear guard is responsible for protecting the formation from any threats to the rear. Remember, this is a rescue operation, not a search! We are rushing past unsecured areas and the only place that is secure is in the center of the four officers. It is crucial that each officer within this formation remains focused on his or her particular area of responsibility. Utility officers must fight the urge to cover long on the hallway and maintain their focus on the doorways. Point officers and rear guards must also maintain their specific areas of responsibility or the safety of the formation and the success of the mission will be compromised. Once deployed, the formation must maintain the focus of their mission, find the shooter and force the surrender decision. Hopefully, they will be directed to the shooter by what they see, hear, and smell. (i.e. gunshots, screaming, information from survivors, etc.)

What happens if information concerning the shooter’s whereabouts is no longer available? At some point the rescue may have to turn into a search. The search mode would only be in effect until contact with the shooter is re-established. The utility officers would begin searching the unlocked rooms, while the point officer and rear guard maintain their areas of responsibility. Since time is critical, they cannot afford to remain in the search mode very long before getting medical help for the injured.

There is always a chance that you will force the shooter out of their plan and into a barricade situation. While this is not a worst-case scenario, it is certainly not the best. The situation has to end so we can get medical help to the injured. If the shooter is preventing this from happening, they must be confronted and stopped. We must not allow critically injured victims to bleed out while we negotiate with the shooter.

We are all concerned about active shooters. As law enforcement officers we are not only concerned from our work responsibility point of view, but also from our point of view as parents. I have four children and it has become a quality of life issue in my house. The community in general has been affected by what is happening not only in our schools but also in the work place. In the last several years this type of violence has occurred in the work place more than in our schools. The QUAD philosophy and tactic should be utilized in all active shooter situations. A violent act can occur in the local factory, grocery store, hotel etc. If and when it does occur, the same philosophy and tactic applies. If people are being injured, once law enforcement is on the scene, the act of violence needs to stop. It is law enforcement’s responsibility, after assessing the situation, to make a controlled and effective entry and stop the violence immediately. This is not a tactical team operation; this is a first responder’s job. If we wait for the tactical teams to arrive it may be too late. Not only do we have to adhere to this new philosophy and tactic, we must also tell the citizens in our communities that we have a tactical solution and have trained hard to execute the plan. We do not have to be specific in the details but they need to know a plan is available should the situation arise. We want to assure them that we will react immediately if they or their loved ones are in trouble. By doing this we are giving some of their quality of life back, thus fulfilling another one of our law enforcement obligations.

We have developed two seminars to deal with active shooter situations. The first seminar is geared for law enforcement administrators and the following topics are covered:

Incident Preparation - This course addresses the first responding supervisor’s responsibilities on managing the crisis. It creates a preparatory packet and checklist for each school in your jurisdiction. The items in the packet include an Emergency Response Form, area maps, Traffic Control Post Form, Line of Sight Evacuation Form, floor plans, ground view photographs, and aerial photographs.

Evacuation Centers - What is an Evacuation Center? Why is it needed? What are the characteristics of a good evacuation center? Who responds to the evacuation center and what are their responsibilities?

Command Post Operations - There are three command posts that are required in a critical incident. They include the Emergency Operation Center, Incident Command Post, and Tactical Command Post. We discuss responsibilities, locations, and who should respond to which command post.

Post-Incident Responsibilities - The initial situation is over; what do we do now? Topics of discussion include debriefings, after action reports, improving your response, and care for your personnel involved.

            QUAD Presentation - A three-hour PowerPoint presentation explaining the philosophy and tactics known as QUick Action Deployment.

The second seminar is geared for administrators and first responders. The QUAD presentation is given in a classroom or auditorium within one of your schools or businesses. We then immediately practice the rescue formation and tactics in the hallways. A brief break is taken, usually a box lunch, then we return to the classroom for a class on room searching and clearing techniques. We immediately return to the hallways and practice 4, 5, and 6 officer searches. This training requires a minimum of 8 hours that leave the officers tired, but confident in this new tactic. Many agencies are requesting this training be extended to 16 hours.

The last topic that should be addressed is whether a written policy in regards to "active shooters" should be issued. From a training standpoint the correct way to deploy an "active shooter" situation is with four officers. This is the safest and correct way to do it. A written policy that states four officers are required before making entry into a crisis situation and two or three very brave officers decide they cannot wait for additional officers and make entry, they are going against policy and may be reprimanded for doing so. QUAD should not have a written policy that may come back to haunt the department and officers. It should be another training tactic or tool in our "bag" to deal with crisis situations. Creating a policy concerning "active shooters" may put departments and officers into a no win situation.